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Summary 
'This article suggests that the recent case of Jepson v The Chief Constable of West 
Mercia Police Constabulary [2003] EWHC 3318 provides a timely invitation to reflect 
upon the degree to which the law on abortion inappropriately elevates the role of doctors 
in the abortion decision.  The author argues that there is an identifiable ideological 
closure operative in abortion law, the roots of which lie in the conceptual foundations of 
the Abortion Act 1967 itself, particularly viewed through the lens of the 1966 Second 
Reading Debate when the House of Commons had the opportunity to consider the 
question most broadly and freely.  She suggests that neither women's rights nor 
potential foetal rights received adequate consideration in the framing of the Abortion Act 
1967 and that the over-medicalisation of the issue, evident then and arguably present in 
the Jepson case, is now ripe for challenge. She suggests the analytical utility of a rights-
based analysis of abortion, while advocating the careful contextualisation of that 
analytical approach within the complex social realities of abortion. She suggests that 
abortion is an inadequately met challenge for law makers and suggests that the time is 
now ripe for renewed public debate.' 
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Introduction 
A Church of England curate recently created a stir in the media by challenging the 
lawfulness of a late(1) abortion (Jepson v The Chief Constable of West Mercia Police 
Constabulary [2003] EWHC 3318). Ms Jepson had been reading through the abortion 
statistics for 2001 when she came across the abortion which had been carried out on a 
foetus of more than 24 weeks gestation, in the Birmingham area.  The foetus had been 
diagnosed as suffering from a bilateral cleft lip and palate, and the abortion had been 
carried out under the Abortion Act 1967. Section 1(1)(d) permits abortion if two 
registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith, that there is a 
substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.(2)  Ms Jepson (who was born with a 
significant facial abnormality - later remedied by surgery) argues that a cleft lip and 
palate cannot amount to a serious handicap within the meaning of the section and that 
the abortion was therefore unlawful. Although the Chief Constable of West Mercia 
Constabulary is re-investigating the case, Ms Jepson intends to seek judicial clarification 
of the law.(3)  She has argued that: 
  
1.  „seriously handicapped‟ in s 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 1967 has to be understood by 
reference to the remediability of the condition;   
2.  a cleft lip and palate does not constitute serious handicap within the meaning of the 
section;   
3.   the foetus at 24 weeks gestation and greater has a right to life pursuant to Article 2 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is only subject to the 
competing Article 2 right of the mother;   
4.  s  1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 1967 is incompatible with Articles 2,3,8 and 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
As Mr Justice Jackson suggests in his judgment granting permission to proceed with a 
claim for judicial review, the case raises serious issues of law and issues of public 
importance.  It is for this reason that Ms Jepson plans to seek clarification of the law, by 
which she means, presumably, clarification of the meaning of „serious handicap‟. 
Arguably, one issue raised by implication is the degree to which abortion is under the 
sole control of the medical profession. It is notable in the case report on Jepson that 
Silber J‟s initial refusal to grant permission to apply for judicial review was based largely 
on the police use of evidence from the medical profession.  The evidence in question 
was a letter from Miss Mellows, the Vice President of the Royal College of Obstetricians 
and Gynaecologists.  She asserted, in that letter, that the correct procedure had been 
followed (two signatures) and, further, that the abortion had been carried out under the 
„serious handicap‟ provision.  She acknowledged that there is no precise definition of 
„serious handicap‟ and that the decision was therefore for the „practitioner to make in 
consultation with the parents and other interested parties‟.  She then stated that „experts‟ 
in the condition had been involved in the decision with the parents.  The barrister 
representing Ms Jepson contended that Miss Mellows‟s letter was flawed by three errors 
of law, the first of which is of most significance for present purposes.  Counsel for Ms 
Jepson argued that the medical practitioners who signed the certificate erred in law 
when they took into account the views of the parents involved.  If this is the case it 
suggests that the Abortion Act grants the power to control abortion solely to the medical 
profession, especially the practitioners whose advice is sought by a woman seeking 
termination. One implication of this is that if doctors think an abortion is a good (or bad) 
idea then others must simply defer to their technical expertise and accept their opinion.  
Medical opinion, in other words, is to operate as a kind of closure.  Further, as reflected 
in the judgment of Silber J, deference to this closure can even extend to medical views 
of the legality of an abortion.  In combination, the law, in form and practice, may 
inappropriately „medicalise‟ abortion.     
Any reductive(4) medicalisation of abortion will tend to recast the complex ethical 
dilemmas involved as questions of medical judgement, first and foremost.  The Jepson 
case implicitly raises the question of how far this is acceptable in a more rights-
conscious age.  It is a question that cuts both ways in relation to the abortion debate, 
which may not be quite what Joanna Jepson intends.  It is likely that any reductive 
medicalisation of the abortion question will result in an incipient denigration of the rights 
of both women and the unborn.  
The medicalisation of abortion is no recent innovation or departure from a previous trend 
– and it will be argued here that the issues raised by the Jepson case reflect the 
conceptual foundations of the Abortion Act 1967.  An examination of those foundations 
reveals both the way in which abortion was medicalised and the related tendency to 
uncritically elevate medical opinion.  The Jepson case issues a timely invitation to reflect 
upon an incipient ideological closure operative in British abortion law.  
In the late 1960‟s, when popular demands for the legalisation of abortion reached their 
height, Parliament was given the opportunity for a wide-ranging debate on the subject.  
The most revealing debate is the second reading of the then Medical Termination of 
Pregnancy Bill in the House of Commons.  This 1966 debate was the parliamentary 
stage at which MPs could speak to the matter in broadest principle.  The second major 
debate, in June 1967, was naturally more narrowly focussed on the text before the 
House, and largely concerned the medical administration of abortion.  That debate 
presupposed, therefore, certain answers to questions of principle, the opportunity for the 
free addressing of which was given, pre-eminently, in the 1966 debate.   
From a rights-aware perspective, the 1966 debate is unsatisfying.  What emerges most 
clearly is the influence of the medical profession‟s strong concern to protect both its 
professional autonomy and control over the abortion decision.  An examination of the 
1966 debate in particular reveals a relative absence of sustained or careful discussion of 
the rights of foetuses or women.  
It is clear that abortion is a procedure available to the medical profession, and that the 
foundations of the 1967 Act were laid in the context of a therapeutic exception to the 
criminal law.  However, it is one thing to recognise abortion as a medical procedure – it 
is another thing entirely for a legislative assembly to recast complex social, ethical and 
legal questions as medical ones.  The following analysis explores the possibility that 
Parliament did just that.   
Medicalising the impetus for the Bill 
The initial movement for abortion law reform does not seem to have come from the 
medical profession.  John Keown, in his book, Abortion, Doctors and the Law (1988), 
reveals that the Abortion Law Reform Association (ALRA) (a pro-abortion rights 
organisation) was instrumental in stimulating the reform movement.  However, it seems 
that abortion was recast during the debates as a medical rather than a rights issue, and 
it is also clear from Keown‟s research that the views of the ALRA were almost 
completely sidelined by the intense involvement of the medical bodies in lobbying Mr 
David Steel MP (Keown, 1988:85). 
One key argument made to support the reform of abortion law was the need for 
clarification of the law in the interests of the medical profession.  Mr Steel, in the 1966 
debate, made the claim that there was „total uncertainty about the exact legal position‟ 
(Hansard HC Deb vol 732 col 1070 (22 July 1966)), and that the abortion decision was 
left to the judgement of individual practitioners without adequate guidance from the law 
as to the grounds upon which such decisions could lawfully be made.  Speakers on both 
sides of the debate described the need for clarification of the law as compelling.(5)  
However, two questions emerge with regard to the credibility of this argument. The first 
concerns the accuracy of the claim that the law was unclear.  The second concerns the 
eventual reality of the 1967 Act and its true effect on the role of medical judgement in the 
context of the abortion decision.  
At the time of the 1966 debate the most noted interpretation of the law was R v Bourne 
([1939] 1 KB 687) a case concerning the termination of a pregnancy resulting from the 
rape of a fourteen year old girl.(6) Keown has suggested that Bourne was an important 
but conservative exposition of the law.  He argues that the pre-Bourne movement in the 
common law towards a less restrictive approach to therapeutic abortion already reflected 
the underlying reality of medical practice, despite widespread representations to the 
contrary (Keown 1988: 60).  Such representations, however, formed a significant part of 
the argumentative foundation for law reform in the House of Commons in 1966 - despite 
the Bourne guidelines for practitioners, and despite subsequent cases developing the 
Bourne approach.   
Keown has argued that, even in the period from the late eighteenth century to the 
Bourne case, despite the absence of a therapeutic proviso in the criminal anti-abortion 
law, abortion operations were not only performed, but indications for the procedure were 
expanded by the medical profession.  Doctors, moreover, faced no real risk of 
prosecution, provided that they abided by their professional ethics. (Keown 1988: 78).  
The Bourne case meant that, „in 1938, after the law was challenged by a member of the 
medical establishment ... legal theory [was] unequivocally brought more into line with the 
realities of clinical practice‟ (Keown 1988: 83).  Keown‟s evidence indicates that the law 
at the time of the debates was neither uncertain nor unduly burdensome to the 
profession. It would, therefore, be more accurate to say that the law was not so much 
unclear as uncodified at the time of the 1966 debate. 
Thus, it is untrue that the law prior to the 1967 Abortion Act was unclear, that doctors 
performed abortions without adequate guidance, or that they were particularly vulnerable 
to prosecution.  On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the practice of the medical 
profession was well established (Keown 1988 78-79) and that the application of the law 
did not in any way militate against, compromise or overburden the medical profession in 
relation to the practice of therapeutic abortion.[7]  Thus, it seems that the demand for 
certainty in the law was somewhat synthetic.   
Given the fact that the pre-existing law seems neither uncertain nor unduly limiting, it is 
likely that the argument for certainty was politically driven. This interpretation is 
supported by Mr Kevin McNamara MP in the 1966 debate.  He quoted from a report 
prepared by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) in which 
the College argued that those seeking major changes in the law governing abortion in 
Britain failed to appreciate that medical practice was not seriously hampered by the law 
as it stood (Hansard HC Deb vol 732 col 1125 (22 July 1966)). 
Keown records an intriguing fact about the difference in approach taken by different 
medical bodies - reflected in the part of the RCOG report that Mr McNamara referred to.  
„A survey of the opinions of the major medical bodies reveals that none opposed reform 
as such, although those whose task it was to perform abortions, the gynaecologists, 
were less enthusiastic for reform than their colleagues in other areas of practice. The 
profession was, however, firmly opposed to any reform that compromised clinical 
freedom either by taking the final decision out of the hands of the medical attendant or 
by specifying the conditions for abortion too exactly.‟(Keown 1988: 87). 
Thus it seems that the movement for reform was instigated by campaigners concerned 
for women‟s abortion rights, and that these interests were submerged beneath medical 
professional interests by Parliament, under lobbying pressure from the medical 
profession.  It is reasonable to suggest that rather than clarification of the law the true 
effect of the proposed reform lay closer to achieving a statutory extension of medical 
control over abortion.   
As we have noted, Mr Steel presented himself as concerned to lift the burden of 
responsibility for the abortion decision from individual doctors. However, this basis for 
reform is revealed as largely chimeric by the effect of the Abortion Act 1967 itself. The 
Act arguably places a more profound responsibility on the profession by extending the 
medical indications for abortion to include social factors.  Thus, the argument about 
lifting the burden of responsibility from the medical profession is not entirely reflected in 
the eventual realities of the Abortion Act.  This tends to undermine the justificatory status 
that the argument might otherwise have had.   It also further reveals the extent to which 
women‟s rights claims were sidelined.  The ALRA had campaigned for an explicit right to 
abortion on social grounds.  The sublimation of social grounds beneath an expanded set 
of medical criteria for abortion meant that the role of the doctor was likewise expanded.  
The Abortion Act, as we shall see, places far greater responsibility for the control of the 
abortion decision on the shoulders of doctors than previously, and in the process, 
recasts social indications for abortion as medical ones.   
In tracing the way in which this happened, the way in which the opinions of the medical 
profession were elevated in the course of the debates, so that their voice, as it were, 
muted the voices of those concerned for female reproductive autonomy, will also be 
noted.   
Medicalising the debate on the Bill 
The reductive characterisation of abortion as almost completely a medical issue, and the 
consequent consolidation of medical control of abortion, is mirrored by a very high 
degree of argumentative deference accorded by the House to medical expertise and 
opinion.  In the 1966 debate, in which MPs could freely address the abortion question in 
its broadest social and moral terms there is a notable degree of relatively uncritical 
deference to members of the medical profession.  The extent to which their opinion was 
canvassed and used in the arguments during the debate is marked,(8) and this 
argumentative deference seems to have been a mechanism (conscious or unconscious) 
for the devolution of legislative responsibility for a deeply complex social and moral 
question to the medical profession.  
In the 1966 debate, the main reasons for according deference to medical opinion appear 
to be founded on two considerations: the degree to which the issue is central to medical 
ethics, and medical expertise.    
The first argument for according deference to medical opinion turned upon the 
realisation that abortion, in the words of Mr Deedes, MP for Ashford, „goes so close to 
the heart of medical ethics‟ (Hansard HC Deb vol 732, col 1092 (22 July 1966)) such that 
it was seen as both wise and necessary to bring the profession into account.  Certainly, 
any legislation that goes to the heart of an ethically fraught professional practice should 
be enacted with the closest possible attention to the best available professional opinion.  
However, it is less clear that the profession should be allowed to sway the legislature on 
matters beyond their professional competence.  In particular, should the opinions of 
doctors on the social complexities giving rise to the demand for abortion have been quite 
as uncritically accepted?  Over-emphasising the opinions of doctors inappropriately can 
suppress important questions of principle, leave social complexities incompletely 
addressed, and mask the genuine necessity for a thoughtful and multi-faceted response 
to complex social issues beneath a medical short cut.    
During the debate, it was clear that medical professionals had strong views concerning 
abortion as a solution to social problems.  Dr John Dunwoody MP, for example, openly 
states that his support for the Bill is not primarily based on medical but on social 
grounds, and continues, „[t]his is a piece of social legislation rather than medical 
legislation‟ (Hansard HC Deb vol 732 col 1099 (22 July 1966)). The problematic nature 
of relying on medical opinion as the basis for social legislation did not go unnoticed.  Sir 
John Hobson MP, for example, objected to clause 1(c) of the 1966 Bill, the clause 
permitting abortion directly upon social grounds.  He was clearly uncomfortable with the 
approach taken by Dr Dunwoody and expressed doubt about the acceptability of 
committing „to the hands of doctors decisions on social and economic problems which 
are to be solved by the termination of prospective life‟ (Hansard HC Deb vol 732 col 
1135 (22 July 1966)). To the response made by Mr Charles Pannell MP that Dr 
Dunwoody did not want to solve social and economic problems so much as to solve, as 
a doctor, the impact of a social or economic problem upon his patient, Sir John Dobson 
remained unconvinced.  He even doubted that this interpretation presented a justifiable 
position. He argued, „[t]he paragraph gives carte blanche to doctors to apply in individual 
cases pretty well whatever views they may take on difficult questions and I do not think 
that it is right to place on the medical profession generally the right to take these 
decisions‟.  (Hansard HC Deb vol 732 cols 1137-1138 (22 July 1966)). 
The removal of clause 1(c) (the social clause) from the final legislation might appear to 
endorse the concern expressed by Sir John Dobson, but in fact the opposite is true.  By 
sublimating the social factors under a definitionally expanded medical criterion the social 
basis for abortion was inevitably placed under medical control, and further from the 
reproductive autonomy claims of women seeking abortion on social grounds (Keown 
1988: 100). This medicalisation of the social grounds for abortion, moreover, raises the 
very real possibility that Parliament inappropriately devolved responsibility to the medical 
profession to solve complex social and ethical problems through the expedient device of 
renaming them as medical ones. This, combined with a high degree of deference to 
medical opinion in the debates, reflects the way in which the abortion question was 
moved further from the claims of those interested in women‟s rights.  Keown argues that 
„the opinions expressed were not confined to strictly medical questions, such as the 
methods and dangers of abortion, but included recommendations on the desirability of 
reform, the appropriate scope of the Bill, and the wording of particular provisions. 
Equally significantly, the bulk of these recommendations were accepted.‟(Keown 
1988:108-109).  
Relying on research conducted by Hindell and Simms (1971) Keown records that the 
influence of the British Medical Association (BMA) in particular, and the Scottish 
gynaecologist Sir Dugald Baird, were decisive in the removal of clause 1(c), the social 
clause, from the Bill. What emerges from the research evidence is a picture of Mr Steel 
moving further away from the recommendations of the ALRA, for whom the social clause 
was the only significant reform in the Bill, and instead adopting the recommendations of 
the medical profession. By dropping the social clause and clause 1(d) (the clause 
relating to hard cases such as rape) at the Committee Stage of the Bill, as Hindell and 
Simms put it: Mr Steel „seemed to accept the main arguments of the BMA and the 
RCOG and to sacrifice the heart of the Bill‟ (Hindell and Simms 1971: 177). 
Significantly, Keown records that, in his statement accompanying the relevant 
amendment, Mr Steel acknowledged the influence of these medical bodies in framing his 
new clause 1(a), included at the expense of clauses 1(c) and 1(d). In moving the 
amendment, Mr Steel argued that it was wrong to give the impression that the social and 
medical indications were distinct, and that most abortions, legal or illegal, were 
performed for social reasons. The charade of fitting them into other categories should be 
abandoned ((1966-1967) X Parl Deb, HC Standing Cttee F, 108-109 – quoted in Keown 
1988: 99).  One would expect, on the basis of this argument, that the social clause might 
openly have been retained.  Yet, it was dropped in favour of expanded medical grounds 
for abortion in clause 1(a). The purported reasoning behind these developments is 
particularly interesting.  Clause 1(a), as amended, now included much broader and less 
clearly specified indications for therapeutic abortion: the doctor could now take into 
account a woman‟s total environment, actual or reasonably foreseeable, in determining 
the level of risk of injury to her health.  Thus, despite removal of the social clause, the 
medical profession retained as much scope for permitting a social basis for abortion as if 
the clause had been retained, simply by an extension of the definition of the medical 
grounds for abortion to include social considerations.  
The arguments for the removal of clause 1(d) (the hard cases clause) were based on 
arguments made by the RCOG and the BMA that such a clause „might mislead women 
into thinking that abortion would automatically be granted in the circumstances it 
specified‟ (Keown 1988: 100).  This overt protection of medical autonomy eschews any 
wording that might conceivably give women a right to abortion in certain circumstances. 
The real burden the profession sought to avoid, it seems, was having fetters placed 
upon its autonomy (Hansard HC Deb Vol 749 col 900 (29 June 1967) Mr David Steel 
MP).  
Thus, the Bill as it finally emerged entrenched the traditional autonomy of the medical 
profession.  Keown records that „[o]ne aspect of the profession‟s successful defence of 
its autonomy was the recommendation that doctors should not be required to make 
judgements on matters beyond their expertise; that the indications for abortion should be 
“medical” not “social”.‟ (Keown 1988: 109). It is suggested that this conclusion is radically 
incorrect. What the profession in fact achieved was a successful defence of its autonomy 
by extending the meaning of „medical‟ to include the „social‟.    
One might argue that the medical profession would have controlled the application of the 
social clause in any case. However, it is problematic for the social basis for abortion to 
be sublimated under a medical definition.  It appears further to disguise the ethically 
problematic nature of doctors deciding the abortion question on social grounds.  The re-
characterisation of the social basis for abortion as a medical question damages the 
integrity of the abortion debate and eclipses question of women‟s rights.  With regard to 
the former, it inappropriately reduces social factors to medical ones, thus evading 
difficult and important issues concerning the morality and adequacy of abortion as a 
solution to social problems. With regard to the latter, it moves any possibility of a social 
basis for abortion further from women‟s rights claims, placing the abortion decision 
further under medical control. 
The undoubted involvement of social factors in health (and the expansion of the modern 
concept of health to reflect this) (Hansard HC Deb vol 732 col 1114 (22 July 1966) (Dr 
David Owen MP)) supports neither a medical professional monopoly over „social 
medicine‟ nor the medical expansionism achieved in the 1967 Act. It would have been 
more imaginative and responsible for Parliament to question the inevitability of the 
modern dominance of the medical profession over „social health‟, and to confine doctors 
to a more focussed, technical role congruent with their expertise and training. Wider 
responsibility for the social issues implicated could be met by a legislature taking bold 
social initiatives, and by appropriate delegation to other state and non-state agencies, 
including community-based initiatives. What seems to emerge is a picture of 
inappropriate delegation – a reductive medicalisation.  It is hard to resist the impression 
that the resulting 1967 Act reflects a deeply impoverished approach to the abortion 
question.  
From simple medicalisation to the complexity of 
rights-talk 
The medicalisation of abortion, and the high degree of deference to the medical 
profession in the very formation of the law, arguably reduced the scope for serious 
systematic consideration either of female reproductive autonomy rights, or, indeed, the 
potential rights of the foetus. The nature of the state‟s interest in the question was, 
likewise, not addressed in any systematic manner.  Women‟s rights and potential foetal 
rights were both diminished in the process of framing the British abortion law.   
It should be clear from what has already been said that women‟s rights were sublimated 
beneath a concern for medical professional autonomy. Interestingly, despite the work of 
the ALRA, which publicly promoted the view that „every woman has a right to an abortion 
and every child has a right to be born wanted‟, the issue of the rights of women to 
abortion featured surprisingly little in the 1966 debate. The strongest characterisation of 
the „women‟s rights‟ position was attributed to the ALRA by Mr St John-Stevas, for 
example, who, despite his admission that two conflicting rights exist, then concentrated 
almost entirely on discussing the rights of the unborn child with no real consideration of 
the rights of women (Hansard HC Deb vol 732 col 1155ff (22 July 1966)). Throughout 
the debate as a whole women‟s rights received scant treatment and were depreciated 
through a lack of thorough consideration. Mr Kevin McNamara revealed the likeliest 
reason when he asked: „where does the medical profession stand if women in certain 
circumstances can claim abortion as of a right, as they could under the Bill?‟ (Hansard 
HC Deb vol 732 col 1127 (22 July 1966)).  Thus, women‟s rights were eclipsed by 
considerations of medical autonomy and control.  We have seen that the lobby 
supporting female reproductive self-determination was sidelined by the lobbying 
activities of the medical establishment.  The dropping of the social clause, and the hard 
cases clause (of which the most obvious is rape) of the Bill in favour of an expanded 
medical definition effectively moved the abortion decision further from the rights-
demands of women.    
Moving to the potential rights of the foetus, in the 1966 debate the right to life argument 
appears in three main forms: in terms of lack of safeguards, the sanctity of life and 
quality of life. 
The first two arguments appear in the wording of an amendment proposed by Mr Wells.  
The amendment sought to refuse Second Reading to the Bill on the grounds that, inter 
alia, it contained „no adequate safeguard against the destruction of potentially healthy 
babies, and undermines respect for the sanctity of human life, which is fundamental to 
British law‟. (Hansard HC Deb vol 732 col 1080 (22 July 1966)). Even here, however, 
there was a noticeable eugenic exception to the application of the sanctity of life 
principle, an exception repeatedly assumed by pro-life speakers. Yet, if a eugenic 
exception to the sanctity of life principle is to be so readily conceded by those who 
defend the sanctity of life principle it needs to be made clear why the intrinsic humanity 
of a handicapped child counts for less than that of a healthy child.  As importantly, the 
question of the basis upon which the distinction between such unborn children should be 
made needs clarifying and defending.  
Part of the answer may lie in the third life-based argument raised in 1966, that of quality 
of life.  The quality of life argument emerged most explicitly in the context of discussions 
of the eugenic basis for abortion - particularly by speakers supporting clause 1(b) of the 
bill, which proposed to permit abortion where there was a substantial risk that the child 
be seriously handicapped. Quality of life arguments, however, can cut both ways.  Mrs 
Jill Knight (who had repeatedly stressed the need to avoid the destruction of healthy 
babies - an implied eugenic concession) answered the eugenic argument by urging 
caution in judging the quality of life of the „deformed‟ seeking to raise a quality of life 
defence of the unborn „spastic child‟ (Hansard HC Deb vol 732 col 1073 (22 July 1966)). 
Mr Kevin McNamara took an ardent pro-life stance, challenging the eugenic clause on 
several grounds that closely foreshadow Jepson.  He raised the difficulties of delineating 
a eugenic abortion; the difficulties of diagnosis in early pregnancy; and the „more 
important question‟ of the foetus itself and the impossibility of judging the quality of life it 
might enjoy - even as a handicapped person (Hansard HC Deb vol 732 col 1128 (22 July 
1966)).  None of these questions, it seems, was adequately answered.(9)   
Given that neither the rights of women, or of the foetus, were adequately discussed 
during the debate, it is no surprise that the 1966 debate reflects a distinct reluctance 
truly to engage with the thorny question of foetal status in relation to women‟s sexual 
autonomy rights.  The full potential interests of the foetus were simply never weighed 
against the rights of the woman.  The thorny nature of the problem, combined with the 
absence of any developed rights-aware culture and the campaigning influence of the 
medical profession, conflated, it seems, to produce a medicalised side-step.  Thus, 
Jepson raises questions that are entirely consistent with the distinctive closures 
operative in the conceptual structure of the Abortion Act 1967, revealingly exposed in its 
broad argumentative foundations.   
Although the conceptual inadequacy of the foundations of British abortion law in the light 
of rights discourse is becoming apparent, it could be argued that rights discourse can be 
no less problematic.    Rights are too easily conceived of atomistically, individualistically, 
in a way that can sublimate broader, more complex matrices of social interaction 
(Glendon 1991). Inappropriate closure of the abortion issue will inevitably occur if and 
when abortion as a complex social question is reduced to any one inappropriately 
elevated framework of approach – and that applies to rights as much as to the 
medicalisation identified above. However, notwithstanding this objection, it is suggested 
that there is a compelling analytical role for rights-based approaches to the abortion 
question.  Rights-based reasoning, like medical opinion has an important role to play – 
so long as there is adequate contextualisation. 
The abortion issue is often portrayed in terms of an irreconcilable polarisation between 
extremes, both in conceptual and in social terms.  It is important to reflect on this briefly 
before proceeding, and to draw some distinctions between different kinds of polarity 
involved in the question, in order to suggest the usefulness of rights-based reasoning.   
First, it is true to say that, unless we are willing, a priori, to privilege one side of the 
debate over the other, the abortion question involves an inescapable nexus between 
female reproductive autonomy interests and the future of the foetus.  There is, therefore, 
a certain analytical bi-polarity in the issue.  Without the foetus being present in a living 
woman‟s uterus it would not present its peculiarly intimate challenge to a woman‟s 
reproductive autonomy - it is precisely the biological location of the foetus that brings it 
into potential conflict with maternal autonomy interests. In order to dismiss this 
fundamental bi-polarity we would need to dismiss either the foetus or the autonomy 
interests of the woman.  It is in part the fundamental analytical bi-polarity of the issue 
that suggests the analytical utility of a rights-based analysis. However, this analytical 
statement should be distinguished from both the assertion that the abortion debate is 
necessarily fundamentally polarised and irreconcilable and from any assertion 
concerning the inevitability of social polarisation between different worldview groups in 
relation to the abortion question. 
In general terms, the public debate over abortion has to date been conceived of as a 
battle between two irreconcilable worldview positions.  This goes beyond strict analytical 
bi-polarity to embrace an impassioned polarisation of the debate, often conceptualised 
as a fundamental polarity between two extreme views: abortion on demand opposed by 
denial of the validity of abortion in any situation.(10)   Related to this is the conception of 
the abortion question as an insurmountable antithesis between two competing rights-
claims: the right of a woman to reproductive autonomy; and the right of a foetus to life.  
The fulcrum upon which these two apparently incommensurable claims pivot is the 
central question of the true status of the foetus, the other important issue raised by the 
Jepson case.  (Ms Jepson seeks to assert that s 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 1967 is 
incompatible with Art 2 ECHR, a claim which directly raises the question of whether or 
not the foetus should be at any stage defined as a legal person capable of bearing 
rights.)   
The status of the foetus, and the true nature of the pro-life claim, was explored by 
Ronald Dworkin in his book Life’s Dominion (1993).  Dworkin argues that the popular 
conception of the debate as inescapably polar is misconceived, being based on a 
„widespread intellectual confusion‟ (Dworkin 1993: 10) – a confusion concerning the true 
meaning of the sanctity of life claim.  
Dworkin suggests that the public debate over abortion has failed to recognise a vital 
distinction between two possible interpretations of the pro-life claim. The first 
interpretation understands the claim as being that human life begins at conception, and 
that, as the foetus has personhood from that moment, abortion is an assault on the 
sanctity of that individual human life and a violation of that individual human being‟s 
fundamental right not to be killed. This position presupposes and is derived from rights 
that all human beings, including foetuses, are assumed to have, and Dworkin labels it as 
the derivative objection to abortion.  The second interpretation of the pro-life claim is 
radically different, and can be understood, Dworkin argues, to be a claim that abortion is 
wrong in principle because it disregards and insults the intrinsic value, the sacred 
character, of any stage or form of human life. He calls this the detached objection to 
abortion, as it „does not depend on or presuppose any particular rights or interests‟ 
(Dworkin 1993: 11). 
According to Dworkin, if the pro-life claim is carefully analysed it becomes apparent that 
no one actually argues as if they seriously believe the derivative claim - the pro-life 
argument is a detached claim. As a result, he believes, a careful balancing of the 
intrinsic value of life can be made – one which weighs and respects the mother‟s 
interests in her own sacred intrinsically valuable human life against the value of the 
foetus.  
Dworkin‟s position appears to be descriptively defensible.  However, its normative 
defensibility as an argument about how the abortion debate ought to be conducted is 
less certain.  Dworkin‟s strategy is to exploit a descriptive point – the fact that most 
people do not take the derivative claim seriously, nor argue in fully derivative terms.  He 
then suggests that the alternative, detached interpretation of the pro-life claim provides a 
sanctity of life value capable of applying equally to mother and unborn child and thereby 
seeks to provide a unitary framework within which the difficult abortion calculus can be 
made.  The suggestion is that this avoids the interminable pessimistic polarisation within 
which the debate is usually conducted. However, Dworkin‟s argument dismisses the 
derivative claim on empirical grounds.  His reliance on the fact that, in reality, we do not 
currently treat the foetus as a full person with legal rights and interests of its own cannot 
answer the normative question of whether the foetus should have legal rights and 
interests of its own. It seems important, in the interests of intellectual integrity and, 
arguably more importantly, inclusive public discourse and justice to groups holding deep 
convictions on foetal status, to address the derivative pro-life claim as a normative claim, 
rather than dismiss it with an argument based on a descriptive claim. Moreover, 
Dworkin‟s empirical justification for abandoning the derivative objection to abortion 
discounts one voice entirely – namely some of the religious opponents of abortion.  
Dworkin rightly concedes that their derivative claim, if taken seriously, would mean the 
proscription of abortion on the ground that it is murder. However, that is precisely the 
claim being made.  Whilst the conclusion may be deeply unpalatable to some liberal 
cultures, this is no good reason to avoid facing the question a priori.  Full respect for 
public discourse rights suggests that their claim should be squarely faced.  
The present approach to foetal personhood involves arguing that, because a foetus is 
not a legal person for certain purposes contingent upon live birth, it cannot be a person 
for the purpose of determining whether it has a right not to be destroyed in the uterus.  
This approach contains an unsatisfying circularity of reasoning. Moreover, it could be 
argued that the foetus should be recognised as having interests that may be more 
impressively at stake than anyone else‟s in the abortion question. Perhaps, rather than 
re-characterising the derivative claim, consigning it to descriptive insignificance, or 
evading it with circular reasoning, we should answer the claim, adequately, applying 
careful analysis liberated from ideological closures. Perhaps it is time to give women‟s 
rights and potential foetal rights (including the derivative pro-life claim) much fuller 
consideration.  In doing so, we could consciously use the analytical bi-polarity of rights 
as a device to avoid too early a dismissal of either claim. 
Conclusion 
Overall, Parliament‟s approach to the formation of abortion law was to avoid „extremes‟ 
by re-characterising the issue and placing control over the abortion question in to the 
hands of the medical profession. It is suggested that a legacy of this is that abortion is an 
unmet challenge for British lawmakers.  A more integral approach to the question than 
that taken to date would entail addressing it much more openly and fully, in all its 
intricacy, as a rights issue – but also as much more than that.    
The Jepson case raises important questions beyond the strict legal ambit of its claims.  It 
suggests that the reductive medicalisation of abortion needs challenging from a rights-
aware perspective, particularly perhaps in the interests of women.  At the same time, it 
re-invites engagement with the difficult question of foetal status by implying that the 
central normative question posed by the derivative pro-life position remains unmet – 
namely - whether or not we should accord the foetus a right to life (at a certain stage of 
development in Jepson) despite the fact that we do not currently accord the foetus legal 
personhood.  
There are undoubtedly moral and social issues of enormous complexity to consider.  
However, if women‟s rights considerations were given full force, if the potential rights 
claim of the foetus were adequately addressed, and if the deep social reasons for 
abortion were also examined, it might become possible to conceive of a more 
transformative political and legal response to abortion.  Welfare and economic rights, the 
encouragement of male sexual responsibility, and the development of innovative 
community-based responses aimed at supporting and empowering women could all 
become live issues in the question, widening it to reflect its genuinely multi-faceted 
nature.  In this context the incommensurability of the conflict between the rights of 
mother and unborn child, while conceptually challenging, could be minimised in terms of 
practical impact (even while being carefully addressed) by social and political initiatives 
designed to reduce demand for abortion by challenging the constrictive pressures so 
often experienced by women (Kenny 1986). Such an attempt at an integrative social 
approach might satisfy Dworkin‟s aim of moving away from the social pessimism of the 
polarisation involved in the question, but achieve it perhaps, without intellectual re-
characterisations designed to avoid the full normative impact of the potential foetal claim.  
The normative challenge of foetal status is not best met by avoidance.  Women‟s 
autonomy rights are not best served by an abortion law based on a reductive 
medicalised conception of the issue.  The question of the rights at stake should be fully 
faced and debated with the analytical bi-polarity of the issue in mind – but not being 
allowed to occlude the complex, multi-layered issues implicated in the abortion dilemma. 
The important question of the appropriate role of the state in relation to the issue should 
also be openly and thoughtfully addressed. Jepson will never achieve all this, but the 
case does imply that we should challenge the devolution of such fraught complexities to 
the medical profession, and question the adequacy of leaving them to meet the complex 
social needs of women faced with such a difficult reproductive choice.  The Jepson case 
provides a timely opportunity to reflect upon an incipient ideological closure operative in 
British abortion law. 
Perhaps we can take the invitation offered by Jepson beyond its strict legal ambit and 
strive to understand the true nature of the competing rights and the socially complex 
factors involved in abortion as democratic partners in a society concerned both to 
empower women and to protect children.  Perhaps the time has arrived for renewed 
public debate. 
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APPENDIX: MEDICAL TERMINATION OF 
PREGNANCY BILL 1966  
Mr Steel introduced the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill in 1966. The detailed 
proposals for clauses at the stage of second reading were outlined in his proposing 
speech. These provided that the medical termination of pregnancy could only be carried 
out on the opinion of two registered medical practitioners, whose opinion should be 
reached on the basis of the grounds contained in clause 1 of the Bill. That clause set out 
the grounds upon which a decision to terminate could be reached in four paragraphs: 
(a)        that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve serious risk to the life or of 
grave injury to health, whether physical or mental, of the pregnant woman, whether 
before, at or after the birth of the child; or 
(b)        that there is substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such 
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped; or 
(c)        that the pregnant woman‟s capacity as a mother will be severely overstrained by 
the care of a child or of another child as the case may be; or 
(d)        that the pregnant woman is a defective or became pregnant while under the age 
of sixteen or became pregnant as a result of rape. 
 
 (1) „Late‟ abortion means the abortion of a pregnancy that has exceeded 24 weeks 
gestation: s 1(1)(a) Abortion Act 1967. 
(2) For an excellent discussion of the alleged justifications for s 1(1)(d) see S Sheldon 
and S Wilkinson, „Termination of Pregnancy for Reason of Foetal Disability: Are There 
Grounds for a Special Exception in Law?‟ (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 85. 
(3) See www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=news/2004/04/17/njep17.xml&sec 
(accessed 10 May 2004). 
(4) „Reductive‟ is used in this context to mean „any explanation of a phenomenon or 
concept which elevates one aspect of it over others and makes a claim, explicit or 
implicit, to explanatory completeness.  The phenomenon or concept in question is 
thereby „reduced‟ to the aspect disproportionately elevated‟:  Anna Grear, „Theorising the 
Rainbow:  The Puzzle of the Public-Private Divide‟, (2003) 9  Res Publica 169-194. 
(5)Hansard HC Deb vol 732, col 1091 (Mr Deedes MP); col 1118 (Mr Angus Maude MP); 
col 1141 ( Mr Roy Jenkins MP); col 1133 (Sir John Hobson MP) (22 July 1966). 
(6) Macnaughten J, giving judgment, had ruled that,„if the doctor is of the opinion, on 
reasonable grounds and with adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence of 
the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman a physical or mental wreck, 
the jury are quite entitled to take the view that the doctor who, under those 
circumstances and in that honest belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of 
preserving the life of the mother‟ (at 694). 
(7) As Keown states, „abortion was induced for increasingly broad indications and 
decisions were no longer arrived at in the light of medical considerations alone... The 
Bourne case of 1938 did not, therefore, liberate medical discretion from an 
uncompromising law. In fact this was recognised by Bourne himself.  Writing shortly after 
his trial he conceded that his aim had not been to reform the law but to ensure its 
declaration‟ (emphasis added) (at 79).  Keown‟s interpretation of matters prior to the 
1966/67 debates is borne out by the speech of Mr Kevin McNamara, the only MP to 
have argued that the law did not really need reform, despite the widely held perception in 
the House to the contrary:  Hansard HC Deb vol 732 col 1125 (22 July 1966). 
(8) Hansard HC Deb vol 732, col 1083 (Mrs Renee Short MP); col 1083 (Mr William 
Wells MP); col 1090 (Mr Edward Lyons MP); cols 1100 – 1104 (Mrs Jill Knight MP); cols 
1109 – 1111(Dame Joan Vickers MP); col 1113(Dr David Owen MP); col 1122 (Mr 
Angus Maude MP); cols 1123- 1128 (Mr Kevin McNamara MP); cols 1128, 1134 (Sir 
John Hobson MP); cols 1148-1151(Mr Leo Abse MP); col 1158 (Mrs Renee Short MP) 
(22 July 1966). 
(9) Nor have they been since.  Sheldon and Wilkinson, in their scrutiny of the main 
arguments for the special exception encapsulated in s 1(1)(d), that „[n]othing has 
happened to challenge Morgan‟s view, expressed ten years ago, that this ground of the 
Abortion Act has remained curiously lacking in sustained critical analysis‟: S Sheldon 
and S Wilkinson, „Termination of Pregnancy for Reason of Foetal Disability: Are There 
Grounds for a Special Exception in Law?‟ (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 85 at 87. 
(10) See R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687 at 29 where Macnaghten J characterises the issue 
in these terms.  See also Hansard HC Deb 732 cols 1077-1078 (22 July 1966) where Mr 
David Steel MP characterised the debate as polarised in two ways:  there were two main 
groups (the reformers and the Roman Catholics); and two extremist poles of opinion  - 
the „abortion on demand‟ position and the „abortion is always wrong‟ position.  (Mr Steel 
characterised the reformers as standing on middle ground) 
